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Abstract 
Do financial crises radicalize voters? We analyze a canonical case – Germany 
during the Great Depression. After a severe banking crisis in 1931, caused by 
foreign shocks and political inaction, radical voting increased sharply in the 
following year. Democracy collapsed six months later. We collect new data on 
pre-crisis bank-firm connections and show that banking distress led to markedly 
more radical voting, both through economic and non-economic channels. Firms 
linked to two large banks that failed experienced a bank-driven fall in lending, 
which caused reductions in their wage bill and a fall in city-level incomes. This 
in turn increased Nazi Party support between 1930 and 1932/33, especially in 
cities with a history of anti-Semitism. While both failing banks had a large 
negative economic impact, only exposure to the bank led by a Jewish chairman 
strongly predicts Nazi voting. Local exposure to the banking crisis 
simultaneously led to a decline in Jewish-gentile marriages and is associated 
with more deportations and attacks on synagogues after 1933. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Can financial crises fan the flames of fanaticism? From the election of Donald Trump to the 
recent elections and referenda in Brazil, Italy, Spain, France, UK, Austria, Germany, Sweden, 
and Greece, the period since 2008 has witnessed dramatic gains for anti-establishment parties 
and politicians. On the 10th anniversary of the Lehman collapse in the summer of 2018, the 
Financial Times argued that "Populism is the true legacy of the financial crisis".1 At the same 
time, the driving forces behind the recent populist surge remain unclear: Rising concerns over 
immigration, growing income inequality, fiscal austerity, and the adverse effects of foreign 
trade have all been named as potential drivers (Moriconi et al. 2018; Dippel et al. 2016; Autor 
et al. 2017; Becker et al. 2017). While recent evidence (Mian et al. 2014; Algan et al. 2017) 
and historical studies (Eichengreen 2018; De Bromhead et al. 2013; Funke et al. 2016) using 
aggregate cross-country data suggest that financial crises are linked to radical voting, there is 
a striking lack of evidence based on micro data identifying a direct effect of financial shocks 
on political radicalization, and the economic and non-economic channels through which these 
shocks reverberate.  
We examine the canonical case of a radical government coming to power amidst 
economic and financial disaster: The rise of the Nazi Party, leading to a genocidal dictatorship 
responsible for World War II with millions of casualties. As aggregate GDP in Germany fell 
by 40% and unemployment surged towards six million (Feinstein et al. 2008), the Nazi party 
went from 2.6% of the popular vote in 1928 to 43.9% in March 1933. While the Nazis’ 
triumph is hard to imagine without the Great Depression, there is no clear cross-sectional 
evidence linking economic distress to their electoral triumphs. Analyses focused on 
unemployment find relatively little to suggest that the economic slump caused the Nazi 
Party’s electoral gains (Falter 1991; Childers 1983; Stachura 1978). Instead, voting studies 
typically conclude that the turn towards the Nazis was broad-based across social classes 
(Falter and Zintl 1988; Kolb 1997). The mass army of unemployed overwhelmingly supported 
the Communists, not the Nazis (Falter 1991; King et al. 2008).2  
At the same time, Germany’s slump was aggravated by a severe banking crisis in the 
summer of 1931. Output had contracted before, but the banking crisis helped to turn an 
ordinary recession into the Great Depression (Figure 1): Over 80% of the decline in output in 
                                                 
1 Financial Times, 30 August 2018. The New York Times similarly titled “From Trump to trade, the financial 
crisis still resonates 10 years later,” New York Times, 10 September 2018. 
2 King et al. (2008) have argued that groups hurt economically by the depression did not all have the same 
interests. Rather, in their view, Nazi support was a case of ‘ordinary economic voting’ – those at low risk of 
unemployment turning to the Nazis and those at high risk turning to the Communists. One exception Galofré-
Vilà et al. (2018), who argue that austerity was a key driver of Nazi voting. 
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durable production from peak to trough occurred after the start of the banking crisis. The 
crisis was triggered by the collapse of Danatbank, one of Germany’s four big universal banks. 
A Central European banking crisis had begun in Austria, with the failure of Creditanstalt in 
May, leading to deposit withdrawals in Germany. In addition, Danat faced unsustainable 
losses as one of its borrowers, a large textile firm, defaulted due to fraud and bad luck. The 
ensuing bank run led to a suspension of bank deposits, the failure of Dresdner Bank as well, a 
three-week bank holiday, and Germany’s de facto exit from the gold standard. Political 
inactivity because of repayments due to the Versailles Treaty and conflict between Germany 
and France over a proposed customs union with Austria had undermined international 
cooperation.3 Both external and domestic factors turned Danat’s troubles into a full-blown 
financial crisis.4 
In this paper, we show that the German banking crisis in the summer of 1931 was 
crucial in boosting the Nazi movement’s electoral fortunes. It not only aggravated the German 
economy’s downturn, leading to more radical voting because of declining incomes. It also 
increased the Nazis’ popularity directly: Their central, long-standing claim that “the Jews are 
our [Germany’s] misfortune”5 was seemingly borne out by indisputable fact. The bank at the 
center of the crisis, Danat, was led by a prominent Jewish banker, Jakob Goldschmidt. We 
first present new evidence on the real effects of the German banking crisis, and then 
document the crisis’ consequences for Nazi support and anti-Semitic attitudes.  
We collect new data on firm-bank pair relationships and wage bills of listed firms 
(based on a contemporary directory of listed firms) as well as city-level income. Shorter 
working hours and lower wages caused income losses, as did disruptions to the flow of credit 
and a collapse of demand from under- and unemployed workers. To identify the effect of 
bank failures on the real economy and voting, we exploit firm-bank pair relationships. Listed 
German firms typically had a strong relationship with a single bank, often the one that had 
brought them to market. The Hausbank (“house bank”) would offer payment services, lend, 
provide capital market services, and send a delegate to the supervisory board of the connected 
firm (Fohlin 2007). We use cross-sectional variation in pre-crisis exposure to failed banks to 
identify effects. German banks lent nationwide in the 1930s (in contrast to the US), and 
                                                 
3 Ferguson and Temin (2003) conclude: “German banks failed in 1931, but the problem was not primarily with 
them. Instead, the crisis was a failure of political will in a time of turmoil that induced a currency crisis” 
4 For the banking crisis, see Born 1967, Ferguson and Temin 2003, Schnabel 2004. Kindleberger (1986) and 
Eichengreen (1992) argue that the Austrian banking crisis was crucial for the German one, highlighting the 
international origin of the crisis. Ferguson and Temin (2003) highlight the inaction of German politicians, and 
the run on the currency, while Schnabel (2004) emphasizes crisis of both the currency and the banks. 
5 This was the motto of Der Stürmer, a highly anti-Semitic Nazi weekly magazine that published the slogan on 
its front page in every issue. 
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information on bank connections was recorded prior to the banking crisis. There is no 
evidence that firms linked to the Danatbank were ex ante riskier than client firms of other 
banks – nor were they different in size, age, or leverage when compared to borrowers of other 
large banks. 
Loan volume at all banks in the aggregate declined by 13% from 1931 to 1933 (Figure 
2, Panel A) and by 10% for big banks that did not fail (Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank). 
Aggregate lending by Danat and Dresdner fell twice as much – by 20%. The fall in wage bills 
was even greater (Figure 2, Panel B): At firms connected to small banks, wages and salary 
expenditure were reduced by 18%; at big banks that did not fail, by 25%, and at Danat- and 
Dresdner-connected companies (“DD-connected” from now on), by 43%.6 In our regression 
analysis, we control for a host of borrower characteristics that explain a large share of lending 
and wage changes; however, the coefficient on DD-connected does not change. Firm 
fundamentals (including observed and unobserved proxies for firm-level credit demand) are 
therefore orthogonal to the bank crisis shock. This suggests that declines in liabilities and the 
wage bill are not driven by firm-level credit demand, but by bank lending restrictions caused 
by the crisis.7 
Before the banking crisis, cities where many firms had banking relationships with DD 
were similar to those with less exposure. They are on average larger and have more blue-
collar workers, but the share of Protestant, of pre-crisis Nazi votes, and the share of Jews are 
statistically indistinguishable. After 1931, cities with a higher share of firms connected to 
Danatbank or Dresdner Bank (prior to the crisis) saw larger income declines, and 
unemployment rose more. Crucially, the greater the exposure to failing banks in 1931, the 
bigger the electoral gains for the Hitler movement became. We first show that higher DD 
exposure at the city level (based on the universe of 5,610 listed firms’ pre-crisis bank 
connections) significantly increased Nazi Party support between the 1930 and 1933 elections. 
There were no pre-trends, and the shift was strong already in 1932.  
Greater economic collapse was one important mechanism that links DD collapse to Nazi 
voting.8 While unemployment did not impact Nazi votes, income decline driven by exposure 
                                                 
6 Figures for aggregate lending are from NBER microhistory database, for individual banks from the Handbook 
of German Stock Companies. Note that Panels A and B do not use exactly the same categories. In Panel A, the 
left-most bar is “all banks” (including Großbanken); in Panel B, it is “all banks that are not Großbanken”. The 
reason is that NBER and the Handbook provide different definitions of bank liabilities and loans. This makes it 
impossible to correct aggregate lending figures for changes at the Großbanken. Nevertheless, the lending 
reduction by small banks was significantly smaller than for large banks. 
7 We perform tests in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2017) below. 
8 Danat exposure affects both city-level change in income and unemployment. City-level Danat exposure or 
change in income affect Nazi votes, but not change in unemployment. This finding in particular provides new 
evidence for the hypothesis in King et al. (2008) that income losses among those who were not unemployment 
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to DD strongly increased support for the Nazi party – a one standard deviation (std. dev.) 
decline in income caused by DD was associated with a 4.3 percentage point (p.p.) rise in Nazi 
support (while the average change in NSDAP vote share from 1930 to 1933 was 22 p.p.). In 
contrast, a one std. dev. change in income (not predicted by DD exposure) increased Nazi 
votes by only 1.1 p.p. 
We also find that non-economic mechanisms from DD exposure to the rise of the Nazi 
party were crucial. After controlling for changes in economic fundamentals,9 higher DD 
exposure by local firms directly increased Nazi voting. The Nazi message was similar across 
Germany. It appears to have had greater success in cities affected by DD failures. With the 
financial crisis, the Nazis had seemingly incontrovertible proof for their misguided theories of 
Jewish domination and destruction. It was an easy story to tell and to sell: As in many other 
countries, Jews were vastly overrepresented in 1930s German high finance (Mosse 1987). 
Nazi propaganda consistently blamed the Jewish population for Germany’s economic ills. 
One infamous cartoon in Der Stürmer, a Nazi weekly, showed a gigantic, all-powerful, obese 
Jewish banker hanging a starving German businessman.10 Goebbels, later Minister for 
Propaganda, instructed party propagandists to emphasize that the banking crisis validated the 
party’s anti-Semitic line. Diaries from the time, such as Hans Schäffer’s (a leading German-
Jewish civil servant), suggest a general surge in anti-Semitic sentiment after the banking 
collapse, even at the highest levels of society.11 Similarly, the Völkischer Beobachter, the 
party’s leading newspaper, argued that the bourgeois middle had shown "an ever-increasing 
convergence towards national socialist language and national socialist thought. The turning 
point came … during the summer crisis 1931…" (VB 31.5.1932). 
In line with anti-Jewish sentiment being a key factor behind electoral gains, effects of 
DD exposure on Nazi voting were greatest in towns with an earlier history of anti-Semitism 
(as proxied by medieval pogroms, or by voting for anti-Semitic parties, 1890-1914).12 In those 
cities, income variation induced by the Danat collapse lead to an even stronger increase in 
NSDAP support than income itself. In addition, the banking crisis’ direct effect – over and 
above economic fundamentals – on Nazi voting was also markedly greater. In contrast, in 
localities without a prior history of anti-Semitism, the non-economic mechanism played no 
role; only income changes explain increased Nazi voting. In other words, where hatred of 
                                                                                                                                                        
benefitted the Nazis. We also examine whether cities that suffered more from the hyperinflation were more 
likely to vote for the Nazis, and find no link.  
9 City-level income and unemployment, in levels or also including polynomials.  
10 Figure A1 in the appendix reproduces the cartoon. 
11 Schäffer documents meetings of the cabinet in which members of the Catholic Zentrum party openly discussed 
alleged plans by Jews to ‘take over’ the German economy.  
12 As in Voigtländer and Voth (2012, 2015). 
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Jews had no deep historical roots, there was no effect of the banking collapse on Nazi voting 
over and above income effects.  
This conclusion is reinforced when we distinguish between Dresdner- and Danat-
connected firms.13 Economic effects of association with Dresdner and Danat are large, 
negative, and statistically indistinguishable. However, for Nazi votes, the effect of Dresdner 
Bank alone is statistically and economically zero – but large and significant for Danat. Only 
Danat-affected towns and cities show evidence of voting for the Nazis above and beyond 
economic factors. This is important for our interpretation because only Danat was led by a 
Jewish chairman.  
Did relations between Jews and gentiles actually worsen differentially in towns and 
cities affected by the Danat collapse? To this end, we collect monthly data on Jewish mixed 
marriages. Inter-faith marriages are rare events and indicative of deep involvement between 
Jews and gentiles. And yet, mixed marriages also act as a ‘canary in the coalmine’, reflecting 
not only romantic attachment but also the social acceptability of intermarriage. Cities with 
more DD exposure saw a sharp decline by 15-17% of mixed marriages just after the banking 
crisis; unaffected places experienced no change (and neither did intra-faith marriages).14  
The financial crisis also had serious aftereffects: Anti-Semitism heightened by the 
banking crisis led to more vociferous forms of hate after 1933. We find evidence that cities 
more exposed to the DD collapse witnessed higher deportation rates of Jewish citizens to 
concentration camps, and more attacks on synagogues, Jews, and their property during the 
1938 pogroms (“Reichskristallnacht”).15 
Our findings contribute to three literatures – the real effects of banking crises, the 
effects of economic shocks on conflict and instability, and the history of the Nazi Party’s rise 
to power in Germany.  
Since Bernanke’s (1983) classic paper, a growing literature has documented the effects 
of financial crises.16 After the 2008-09 financial crisis, there is clear evidence that firms 
suffered from a decline in lending (Duchin et al. 2010, Ivashina and Sharfstein 2010, Jiménez 
et al. 2012). More recent evidence focuses on the real (economic) effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis (Chodorow-Reich 2014; Paravisini et al., 2014; Jiménez et al. 2017; Huber 2018; 
                                                 
13 While our main analysis uses them jointly since they were forcibly merged as a result of the banking crisis, 
splitting them allows for additional insight into the anti-Semitic nature of reactions to the banking crisis. 
14 Effects are insignificant until the banking crisis and (statistically and economically) significant afterwards. 
15 Note that there is no statistically significant difference between the share of Jews across cities exposed to 
failing banks vs. those unexposed.  
16 See, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
 6
Bernanke 2018).17 There is also evidence that financial crises can bring medium- or long-term 
costs by leading to the wrong (economic) policies thereafter (Mian et al. 2014). We advance 
this literature by showing that the real impact of a banking crisis is to bring political 
extremism, going beyond the real effects (e.g. unemployment) of a credit crunch.  
The conflict literature has investigated the effects of a variety of adverse economic 
shocks, such as rainfall variation or commodity price shocks. Results typically show that 
economic distress makes civil war and other forms of conflict more likely (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; Miguel et al. 2004).18 Autor et al. (2017) use exposure to trade with China as a 
source of identification and demonstrate that US electoral districts were more likely to support 
extreme candidates the more adverse the trade shock was. Similarly, Dippel et al. (2016) 
argue that negative trade shocks increased support for radical right-wing parties in Germany 
in recent years.19 However, Funke et al. (2016), analyzing financial crises over the past 140 
years covering 20 advanced economies and more than 800 general elections, conclude that 
political extremism does not increase during normal recessions or after severe macroeconomic 
shocks that are not financial in nature, but only after financial crises. Instead of aggregate 
cross-country data, we use new micro-data (firm-bank connections and firm- and city-level 
data) in conjunction with a banking crisis shock to show how a financial crisis radicalized 
voters and facilitated the rise of the Nazi power in 1933 via both economic and non-economic 
mechanisms.20 Our evidence suggests that income reductions arising from a banking crisis can 
be special. In our case, income declines due to the Danat crisis implied 10 times more Nazi 
voting than a similarly-sized income change not due to Danat.21 This is true despite the fact 
that Danat- and non-Danat induced income changes have the same average and the left tail is 
similarly large.  
The rise of the Nazi Party has attracted extensive scholarly attention over the last 80 
years. Initial analyses emphasized either class-based theories (Lipset 1960; Hamilton 1983) or 
                                                 
17 This evidence as well as recent theoretical work on the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy 
during the 2008-09 financial crisis is summarized in Gertler and Gilchrist (2018). For an analysis of the US 
Great Depression and its banking crisis, see Calomiris (1993) and Calomiris and Mason (2003). Benmelech et al. 
(2017) use an empirical strategy similar to Almeida et al. (2009), and demonstrate a link from the 1930s US 
banking crisis to firm employment. In contrast with the US crisis in the 1930s, large banks in Germany were 
serving to the whole country. This makes it less likely that local demand shocks caused banking distress.  
18 At the same time, democratic transitions also appear to become more likely during periods of low income 
(Lipset 1960; Brückner and Ciccone 2009). 
19 We find that trade shocks had real effects – but no political ones. An alternative literature has argued that 
immigration is a major determinant of right-wing voting. See for example Moriconi et al. (2018), who argue that 
the skill of immigrants is key. 
20 Two recent, innovative papers also study financial shocks and political outcomes using micro data and bank 
shocks. Braggion et al. (2018) and Gyongyosi and Verner (2018) respectively analyze bank lending and social 
unrest in China in 1933 and bank FX lending in the 2008 crisis and political extremism voting in Hungary. 
21 Based on columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 7.  
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theories of the masses (Ortega-y-Gasset 1932; Arendt 1973). Research based on voting 
records have largely superseded this earlier literature, demonstrating that, far from being a 
party dominated and supported principally by members of the lower middle class, the Nazi 
party was a “catch-all” party that drew support from all walks of German society (Falter 1981; 
Childers 1983). Nonetheless, some differences in the cross-section emerge: Research using 
district-level voting results shows that Protestants were much more likely to offer support than 
Catholics, that the better to-do increasingly turned towards the Nazis after 1930, and that the 
unemployed overwhelmingly supported the Communists instead.22 King et al. (2008) use 
ecological inference to show that while a broad-based shift underpinned the Nazi’s rise to 
electoral success, some groups were more susceptible. This is especially true of the self-
employed from high-unemployment areas, and domestic employees from low- to medium- 
unemployment areas. While few doubt that the rise of the Nazis was facilitated by the Great 
Depression (see e.g. Evans 2004; Kershaw 2016), there is as of now no compelling evidence 
that more economically distressed areas of Germany turned to the Hitler movement at the 
polls.23 By collecting new data on city-level incomes, firm-level wage bills and bank-firm 
connections, in conjunction with the banking crisis shock of the summer 1931, we provide 
direct evidence of a link between economic distress and extremist electoral success. 
Importantly, income declines rather than unemployment increases were an important 
determinant of the Nazi surge after 1930 that propelled the party to office. 
Our main contribution is to document the impact of a banking crisis on political 
extremism, going beyond the real effects of a credit crunch. Importantly, we demonstrate that 
both economic and non-economic channels play an important role. We find strongly different 
effects on voting from Danat versus Dresdner, and sharply contrasting results for towns with 
or without deep-rooted anti-Semitic attitudes. This suggests that the mapping of financial 
distress into political extremism depends on whether and which scapegoat can be easily 
blamed.24  
We proceed as follows. We first provide historical context and background, and then 
describe our data and empirical strategy. Next, we present our main empirical results, before 
discussing the robustness of our findings. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
22 We do not find significant robust evidence that Danat failure led to more votes for the Communists.  
23 One notable exception is Galofré-Vilà et al. (2018), who argue that austerity in the form of higher taxes was a 
key reason for pro-Nazi voting. When we control for austerity among other variables, our results remain 
unchanged in statistically significance and in the size of the estimated coefficients. 
24 Along similar lines, Eichengreen (2018) emphasizes the importance of identity issues on political extremism 
in the context of economic shocks. 
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II. Historical background 
 
In this section, we briefly describe three aspects of the historical context – the Great 
Depression in Germany, the banking crisis of 1931, and the rise of the Nazi Party to power. 
 
A. The Great Depression in Germany 
The Great Depression in Germany was amongst the worst world-wide. Peak-to-trough, 
German industrial output fell by 40%, while the corresponding figure is around 20% in 
Britain and 10% in Japan. The only other major industrialized country with a similarly severe 
decline in economic activity was the US. In 1933, Germany counted 6 million unemployed. 
Unemployment spelled misery, as elsewhere. While the unemployment insurance system 
looked after those losing their jobs, benefits were cut several times. After 20-27 weeks, the 
unemployed received emergency aid, which offered only minimal support.25 Unemployment 
was only the most visible manifestation of economic misery. Workers were put on short 
working hours, civil servants’ wages and public pensions were reduced, and many small 
business owners and entrepreneurs suffered severe income declines. GDP contracted by 
almost 40%; money wages and real earnings declined by more than 22% peak-to-trough 
(Overy 1996). 
Fiscal austerity was one important feature of the German slump (Ritschl 1998). The 
federal government, states, and municipalities had borrowed heavily before 1929. A good 
share of the money raised came from abroad. Once international debt markets froze, 
authorities had to try to balance their books by raising taxes and cutting expenditure. 
Germany’s export industries suffered as protectionism surged after 1929. These were already 
saddled with relatively high labor costs; new tariffs and difficulties in encountering export 
financing therefore translated into rapidly falling sales of German products abroad 
(Eichengreen 1992). By 1933, German exports had declined by 63 % relative to their 1929 
value.26 
 
B. The banking crisis of 1931 
After the outbreak of Germany’s banking crisis, the decline in output accelerated (Figure 1). 
While the production of durables was down some 4% by the spring of 1931 compared to its 
                                                 
25 At the height of the depression, unemployment benefits became means-tested.  
26 We later examine the extent to which radical voting results can be explained these alternative channels. 
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pre-crisis peak, it had fallen by a full 10% by the summer, at the height of the banking crisis, 
only to decline another 5% during the rest of the year.27  
The 1931 banking crisis had several causes, and there is no overall agreement as to 
their importance. German banks entered the Great Depression with relatively low equity 
ratios, and a high share of their deposits was short-term and came from abroad (Eichengreen 
1992). The crisis was nonetheless unanticipated, with banks’ stock prices giving no indication 
of trouble ahead. In May 1931, the Austrian Creditanstalt revealed large losses. When it 
collapsed, foreign deposit withdrawals accelerated in other countries, including Germany 
(Kindleberger 1986). While the Austrian banking crisis unfolded, huge losses at a German 
textile firm, Nordwolle, came to the attention of its main creditor, the Darmstädter 
Nationalbank (Danatbank or simply Danat). Nordwolle management was unlucky in its ill-
timed speculation, and also had been hiding losses for a while (Ferguson and Temin 2003, 
Born 1967). Losses on the loans to the textile firm were large, equivalent to 80% of 
Danatbank’s equity, and threatened the bank’s survival.  
There were runs on Dresdner and Danatbank, and a three-week bank holiday. 
Transfers and other transactions remained barred for over a month (Born 1967). The 
Reichsbank’s reserve position severely circumscribed its freedom of action: Because of its 
commitment to the gold standard, her ability to come to the aid of Danat was limited (James 
1985, Schnabel 2004). International support for the Reichsbank could help to shore up the 
banking system, and to stay on the gold standard. However, Germany and France were at 
odds over German-Austrian plans for a customs union, and the German government pushed 
for revisions to reparations payments. Thus, lingering international tensions undermined any 
bid for multilateral support (Eichengreen 1992). An attempt to merge Danat with Deutsche 
Bank also failed. By mid-July, many banks were experiencing runs. In the end, the 
Reichsbank had to suspend convertibility of the Mark into gold, declare a bank holiday, 
merge Danatbank and Dresdner, and the federal government had to recapitalize all 
Großbanken (Born 1967).  
Some scholars have argued that the German banking crisis was a “twin crisis”, with a 
latently fragile banking system exposed to foreign withdrawals and a run on the mark 
(Schnabel 2004). Underlying this view is the belief that many banks lent recklessly in the late 
1920s, because they believed themselves “too big to fail.” Other scholars have argued that 
“the crisis was primarily [an] exchange rate and foreign liability crisis, which … would have 
occurred … even if the banks had acted with exemplary caution in the 1920s.” (Hardach 
                                                 
27 We chose durables because they often drive a large part of the variation in demand during downturns, and may 
be particularly affected by financial-sector shocks (Romer 1990).  
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1976). Ferguson and Temin emphasized politics, arguing that the crisis was “made in 
Germany” – that the German government’s bid to renegotiate reparations caused foreign 
withdrawals of funds and subsequent banking collapse (Ferguson and Temin 2003; Temin 
2008).  
For our purposes, we do not need to resolve the issue of the crisis’ ultimate cause. 
What is clear is that the banking crisis was caused by a confluence of multiple external 
factors, from the collapse of the Creditanstalt to the reparations problem and pressure on the 
German currency. Even if the banks might have acted with less than exemplary caution – and 
a banking crisis ex post is no proof that they did – there is no evidence of Danatbank (and 
Dresdner) being laxer in its lending than other Großbanken.28 
 
C. The rise of the Nazi Party 
From relatively obscure beginnings in post-war Munich, the Nazi Party grew in influence and 
membership during the hyperinflation. In 1923, it made a violent but unsuccessful bid for 
power, the so-called Beerhall Putsch. After its bloody collapse, Nazi leaders were tried and 
sent to prison, Hitler most prominently among them; the party was declared illegal. A 
growing number of prominent right-wing politicians beat a path to the door of his prison cell. 
Using his time in prison, Hitler wrote Mein Kampf (“My Struggle”) about his political vision 
and experiences so far. Anti-Semitism was integral to his ideology. His beliefs on the 
influence of Jewish finance are well-summarized when he argued that “Jewish finance 
desires… not only the economic smashing of Germany, but also its complete political 
enslavement” (p. 905).29 According to Hitler, the lost war, the humiliating reparations 
settlement as part of the Versailles treaty, and the hyperinflation were all caused by a Jewish 
conspiracy. 
After an early release from internment, Hitler returned to politics at the head of the 
newly-legalized party (Bracher 1955). It initially had paltry success at the polls. In the 1928 
Reichstag election, the Nazi Party received a mere 2.6% of the vote – during Weimar’s 
“Golden Years”, it was languishing in obscurity (Stachura 1978). All of this changed after 
1929. As the Great Depression spread, politics became increasingly acrimonious. The last 
democratically elected Chancellor Müller resigned in 1930, after a row over the rapidly rising 
cost of unemployment insurance. Thereafter, Chancellor Brüning governed without a 
parliamentary majority, supported by the emergency powers of President von Hindenburg 
(Bracher 1955).  
                                                 
28 We return to this point below, in section III.C. 
29 Cited according to the 1941 edition (Reynal and Hitchcock).  
 11
After its poor showing at the polls in 1928, the Nazi Party changed its tune. It no 
longer publicly advocated a violent overthrow of the established democratic order. Instead, 
Hitler emphasized that only legal means would be used to come to power. As the party 
seemingly moved towards the political middle, it became more acceptable to middle- and 
upper-class voters (Evans 2004), and Hitler formed links with businessmen (Ferguson and 
Voth 2008). The party also played a prominent role in a plebiscite against the rescheduling of 
Germany’s reparations obligations (“Young Plan”). While the plebiscite against the plan was 
ultimately defeated, it provided a platform for the Nazis to argue that Germany was being 
enslaved by foreigners for generations to come (Hett 2018). In the aftermath of the plebiscite, 
the party scored its biggest success yet – in the September 1930 election, it won 18.3% of the 
vote. Compared with 1928, it had gained an additional 4.6 million votes.  
The Nazi Party’s biggest electoral breakthrough came in July 1932 (the first federal 
parliamentary elections after the banking crisis, twelve months after). In the federal 
parliamentary election in July 1932, the Nazi Party received 13.7 million votes. It thus 
became the largest party in parliament, receiving more votes than social democrats and 
communists combined. Fully confident of his claim to the chancellorship, Hitler negotiated 
his entry into the government – and failed to convince an aging President von Hindenburg. By 
November 1932, in another round of federal parliamentary elections, electoral support began 
to slip. The Nazi vote count fell by 2 million (Evans 2004).  
By late 1932, many political commentators confidently predicted that the Nazis were 
on their way out. Barely a month later, after lobbying from arch-conservative advisors around 
him, President von Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor, in a cabinet where leading 
Nazi politicians were in a minority. Nonetheless, within two months, the Nazis had staged 
another set of elections, and taken over effective power in the country (Turner 2003). The rise 
of the Nazi party to power and the end of German democracy was only a prelude, ultimately 
leading to genocide and the Second World War with more than 60 million casualties. 
 
III. Data and main variables 
 
A. Data 
We use a number of data sources for interwar Germany, several of them hand-collected and 
digitized for the first time. To identify the effect of bank failures on the real economy and 
voting, we exploit firm-bank pair relationships. A key challenge is to establish the connection 
between firms and banks, since historical data on individual loans are unavailable. Listed 
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German firms typically had a strong and persistent relationship with a single bank. Their 
Hausbank (“house bank”), usually the bank that had brought them to market, would offer 
capital market and payment services (such as dividends), supply credit, and at times send a 
delegate to the supervisory board of the connected firm (Fohlin 2007). We hence use 
information on banks paying out firms’ dividends to establish firm-bank connections. 
Investors could collect dividends in exchange for coupons tendered at branches of the main 
bank for each listed company (so-called “Zahlstellen” – place of payment). Information on 
“Zahlstellen” is listed in the Handbook for German Stock Companies (“Handbuch der 
deutschen Aktien-Gesellschaften”), a yearly 4,000-pages compendium of balance sheet 
information for each listed German company. We use yearbooks for 1929 and 1934 to collect 
firm-level data on bank connections and balance sheet items.30 We record bank connections 
prior to the banking crisis. Since German banks lent nationwide in the 1930s (in contrast to 
the US), we use cross-sectional variation in firms’ pre-crisis exposure to failed banks to 
identify effects.  
We begin our analysis at the firm level. First, we collect data on total assets, total 
capital, as well bank connections in 1929 for 5,610 firms. These firms represent the universe 
of German listed firms, with assets totaling up to 3.6 billion Reichsmark (RM), which 
represent 40 % of GDP, or around two-thirds of all non-financial assets. Since listed firms 
tend to be less constrained financially than privately-owned firms, our results likely represent 
a lower-bound of true effects. 
For each firm, we record whether “Zahlstelle” lists Danatbank or Dresdner Bank, one 
of the other Great Berlin Banks (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank), or any other bank. Since the 
focus of the first part of our analysis is on the real effects of the banking crisis, among the 
5,610 firms we identify all those reporting their wage bill in 1929 and 1934. For this sample 
we collect pre-crisis balance sheet items in 1929 on founding date, total assets and capital, 
return on assets, dividends, industry, and city, as well as total wage bill in 1929 and 1934.31 
This results in a sample of 386 firms in 239 cities and 20 industries. Of these, 59 firms list 
either Danatbank or Dresdner Bank as “Zahlstelle” (of which 27 firms list Danatbank), 63 
                                                 
30 Each handbook generally reports balance sheet data either for July of the previous year or February of the 
current year. For example, the 1934 Handbook reports July 1933 or February 1934 data items, which is why the 
1934 Handbook reflects firm balance sheets during the trough of the recession in 1933. 
31 While today data sources like Compustat provide easy access to comparable information across firms, 
historical handbook data do not. While for some firms we have information on the bank, assets, and wages, other 
firms provide none of this information. There are no filing requirements or any consistent form of balance sheet 
across firms. Firms that report a wage bill in 1929 can be missing in 1934 for several reasons: they do not report 
the wage bill anymore; they exited the market; they delisted; or they merged. Unfortunately, we can only observe 
the first of these possibilities and thus analyze the intensive margin only. In the city-level analysis, we use all 
listed firms (the universe), e.g. even if they do not report wage bills. 
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firms list one of the other Großbanken, and 17 are connected to both Danat/Dresdner and at 
least one other Großbank. For the sample of firms reporting their wage bill, we additionally 
collect information on liabilities in 1929 and 1934, which are available for 258 out of our 386 
firms. We use the label “DD” for firms connected with either Danatbank and Dresdner Bank, 
as both were merged and suffered similar declines in lending; we also use the terms connected 
and borrowing interchangeably. However, in some of our analysis, we distinguish Danat 
versus Dresdner connections. 
We then analyze data at the city level. From the universe of listed firms in the 1929 
Handbook, we calculate measures of city level exposure to DD (explained in detail below). 
For a total of 187 cities, we assemble information on city population and unemployment from 
1930 to 1934 from the Statistical Yearbooks of German Cities (“Statistisches Jahrbuch 
deutscher Städte”), as well as total city labor force from the 1933 census. We use data on all 
major German federal elections inform 1924 to 1933. For each election, we record the number 
of votes for the different parties at the city level from German federal statistics (“Statistik des 
Deutschen Reichs”, ICPSR 42). To measure the extent of suffering during the hyperinflation, 
we use the vote share of the VRP (“Volksrechtspartei”), an association-turned-party of 
inflation victims (Fritsch 1984). In addition, we use information on destroyed and damaged 
synagogues (based on Alicke 2008) and deportations of Jews (Bundesarchiv). Falter and 
Hänisch (1990) provide information on the share of blue-collar workers, Protestants, and Jews 
for each city.  
We also assemble new data on city income in 1928 and 1934 from Germany’s 
statistical handbooks (“Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Neue Folge 1884-1944”, bulletins 378 
and 492).32 To shed light on the underlying mechanism, we use data on historical pogroms as 
well as votes cast for anti-Semitic parties in elections during the pre-war period (1890-
1914).33 We also collect data on monthly marriages between Jews and gentiles for a sub-
sample of 51 cities. Our final data set contains 187 cities for which we have data on elections, 
income, and exposure to DD. Table A1 in the Appendix gives a comprehensive overview of 
variables and sources. 
 
                                                 
32 The German government collected data on city incomes every two years, but due to tight budgets not in 1930. 
Hence, 1928 and 1934 are the closest available data before and after the crisis. Note that the data on year 1932 
could reflect income in July 1931, which is at the time of the banking crisis.  
33 The data were assembled by Voigtländer and Voth (2012, 2015). 
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B. Measures of bank-firm connections and city exposure 
In the first part of our analysis, we look at firms’ responses to the collapse of Danat. To 
measure a firm’s connection with a bank, we create two dummies: Danat+Dresdner (or DD) 
equals 1 if in 1929 a firm’s bank “Zahlstelle” lists Danatbank or Dresdner Bank, and 0 
otherwise; Großbank equals 1 if the firm is connected to any of the other Great Banks, 0 
otherwise. As dependent variable we use the growth in total wage bill from 1929 to 1934, or 
the growth in total liabilities over the same period. The change in wage bill reflects changes in 
employment, as well as average wages, i.e. firms’ total payroll, while the growth of liabilities 
measures the channel by which banks affect firms (credit) and whether firms can substitute 
with other source of finance. As controls we use pre-crisis firm age, size (log of total assets), 
leverage, return on assets, as well as city and industry fixed effects. 
To study the effects of DD failures and subsequent credit reduction on cities in 
Germany, we calculate a measure of city exposure to Danat or Dresdner. In each city, we sum 
across firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank, weighted by their respective size in 
each city (based on assets). Since we do not directly observe firms’ loan volume, each firm is 
weighted by its 1929 leverage ratio (defined as liabilities over capital). City c’s exposure is 
then calculated as 
 
 
 
Ifc is an indicator for whether firm f is located in city c. To construct city-level exposure, we 
use data on the universe of listed firms in 1929 (that is, a total of 5,610 firms).34 
Our main outcome variables are the change in city income from 1928 to 1934 and the 
change in NSDAP votes from 1930 to 1933. We also analyze other federal parliamentary 
elections, including those in 1932. The change in income is defined as the growth rate from 
1928 to 1934. The change in NSDAP votes is the change in the share of votes from 
September 1930 to March 1933. Additionally, we define the dummy synagogues that takes 
value 1 if a synagogue was damaged or destroyed in a city after 1933; as well as total 
deportations from 1933-1945 over total Jewish population in 1933. We also construct the 
                                                 
34 The higher number of observations – compared with the firm dataset – comes from the fact that we use all 
firms that report assets, liabilities, and capital in 1929, even if they do not report their wage bill and have no 
corresponding 1934 entry. 
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change in the unemployment rate from 1930 to 1933. The unemployment rate is defined as 
the yearly unemployment count over total labor force in 1933.35 
 
C. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, presents summary statistics for our main variables at the firm level. The 
average wage bill in our sample declined by 19.5 percent, and liabilities, by 16 percent. As of 
1929, the average firm was 30 years old and relatively large, reflecting the fact that our 
sample covers listed companies. Since only 386 out of 5,610 firms reported their wage bill, 
the issue of sample selection arises. For example, larger firms might be more likely to report 
their wage bill. In Figure 3, Panel A, we compare the distribution of log(assets) for the sample 
of firms that report their wage bill in 1929 (386 observations) and the universe of listed firms 
in 1929 (5,610 observations). While the full sample shows slightly more dispersion, both 
distributions are similar and the difference in means is insignificant. This suggests that our 
sub-sample of firms reporting a wage bill is similar to the average listed firm.  
How similar were firms connected with DD to borrowers connected with other banks 
in terms of pre-crisis riskiness? If DD-connected firms were significantly riskier, the declining 
wage bill could reflect weaker firm fundamentals, including weaker credit demand, not 
changes in credit supply. We define firm leverage (or debt-to-equity-ratio) as liabilities over 
capital and compare leverage for firms borrowing from Danat or Dresdner, from any other 
Großbank, and from other banks for the full 1929 firm sample. Figure 3, Panel B, shows that 
DD (blue solid line) and Großbank (red dashed line) borrowers were almost identical in terms 
of pre-crisis leverage. Firms that borrowed neither from Danat nor Dresdner, nor any other 
Großbank (black dashed line), had higher leverage. Thus, in the full sample of listed firms, 
firms borrowing from Danat or Dresdner were not riskier before the crisis.  
Figure 4 plots the geographical distribution of cities by exposure. DD-exposed cities, 
i.e. cities with firms connected to DD, are spread out over Germany, reflecting the fact that 
Germany’s large banks served borrowers all across the country. There is no geographical 
clustering of DD-connected firms. 
To further investigate characteristics of DD-connected firms, Table 2, column 1, uses 
the dummy DD-connected as dependent variable and runs it against a set of observable firm 
characteristics, for the sample of 386 corporations reporting their wage bill. The 59 firms 
connected to Danat are significantly larger, but have lower leverage. They are similar in terms 
of age, return on assets, and capital-to-labor ratio (wage bill over assets). The overall pattern 
                                                 
35 We choose to standardize unemployment by the 1933 labor force. Using yearly total city population as 
denominator yields identical results. 
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is similar if we control for industry fixed effects (column 2) and city fixed effects (column 3). 
When we compare DD-connected firms with Großbank-connected firms only (columns 4 and 
5), there are no longer any differences in terms of size, but return on assets is actually higher. 
However, its coefficient also declines in size and becomes insignificant when we control for 
industry fixed effects.  
Danat expanded rapidly in the 1920s. One might be concerned that (some) new 
borrowers were of lower quality. To examine this issue, we examine the bank’s history. In 
1922 Darmstädter Bank für Handel und Industrie merged with Nationalbank für Deutschland, 
creating Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danat). Thereafter, Danat expanded. If Danat 
selectively picked borrowers with weak fundamentals during its period of rapid expansion, we 
might be picking up the greater vulnerability of recently-added firms. The decline in Danat 
borrowers’ wage bill growth would then be due to relatively weak(er) firm fundamentals, and 
not the contraction in credit supply.  
To deal with this issue, we hand-collect data on borrowers for the two predecessor 
banks in 1922. If firms that already borrowed from either bank in 1922 were less risky than 
(new) borrowers in 1929, we can rule out that Danat was adding less sound clients. The online 
appendix (Table OA1) shows that except for size and age, differences between old and new 
borrowers are not statistically significant. Importantly, old and new borrowers were similar in 
terms of leverage and return on assets. The significant difference in age and size is to be 
expected, as firms that already appear in 1922 are older almost by definition.  
 Next, we turn to city-level variables. Table 1, Panel B, gives descriptive statistics for 
our city sample. We have data for 187 cities for most variables. On average, the Nazi party 
gained 22 p.p. between 1930 and 1933 in cities in our sample. The Communists saw almost 
no change in their vote share. Incomes declined by 14 percent. The mean (median) city in our 
sample had 93,000 (41,000) inhabitants in 1930, and 42% of those in employment were blue 
collar workers. The average share of Protestants was 66%. Jews were a tiny part of the sample 
population – 0.9%, higher than for the country as a whole because Jews were more likely to 
live in cities. Our explanatory variable, DD exposure, has an average value of 0.081, with a 
standard deviation of 0.12.  
To examine the balancedness of our sample of cities, Table 3 runs multivariate 
regressions at the city level, using DD exposure as dependent variable. Positive exposure to 
DD is significantly correlated with city size, and negatively correlated with the share of blue-
collar workers. While the effect of the share of Protestants is not significant (columns 1 and 
2), it is not small. Since the share of Protestants was a significant predictor of Nazi voting, we 
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control for it throughout (together with other covariates). Interestingly, there are no significant 
differences in the share of Jews across cities more or less exposed to DD. Neither do cities 
differ statistically in pre-crisis income per capita or unemployment rates. This holds once we 
add fixed effects for Germany’s 15 electoral districts. Once the sample is reduced to cities 
with non-zero exposure to large banks (column 3) or cities for which we have information on 
historical anti-Semitism in column (4), differences are no longer statistically significant.  
 
IV. Main results 
We first show, at the firm level, that firms connected to Danat saw rapid declines in their 
liabilities and wage bills. Next, we demonstrate that, at the city level, exposure to Danat 
spelled lower incomes, higher unemployment, and growing radicalization. 
 
A. Firm level 
We examine the effect of Danat’s and Dresdner’s collapse on firms’ wage bills by estimating: 
 
 
 
where yf is the change in firm f’s outcome (liabilities or wages) between 1929 and 1933, DDf 
is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm was connected to Danat or Dresdner in 1929 and 0 
otherwise, and controlsf are pre-crisis firm controls (log total assets, age, return on assets, and 
leverage). To account for the fact that shocks to firms within the same city may be correlated, 
we cluster standard errors at the city level.36  
Panel A of Table 4 gives the results for liabilities; Panel B for wages. Firms with DD 
connections reduced their total liabilities by 13.3 p.p. (column 1). In column 2, we add firm 
controls, and find a coefficient of -11.6 p.p. Column (3) allows for heterogeneity by industry, 
using dummies for 20 industries that absorb any unobservable characteristics that affected all 
firms within each sector, such as changes in exports.37 Adding industry fixed effects leaves 
the coefficient on DD largely unaffected. Columns (4) and (5) address the concern that Danat 
acquired a selection of risky borrowers during its rapid expansion after 1923. We split the DD 
dummy into firms that were already connected to Danat before 1923, and those who only 
became connected afterwards. Both old and new Danat borrowers saw a decline in their 
                                                 
36 Since we only use five categories of banks (four large ones and the rest), we cannot cluster at the bank level, 
but results remain significant if we cluster at the bank*industry or bank*city level. 
37 We lose two observations in column (3) since some industries only have one firm. 
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liabilities. While it was somewhat bigger for new borrowers, the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable from each other.38 
In column (6) we restrict the sample to cities with more than one firm so as to use city 
fixed effects. The coefficient rises slightly in size, relative to column (2). Then, adding city 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects, R2 increases by a factor of 5 (from 0.09 to 0.52), 
between column (6) and column (8). DD remains significant. This suggests that 
unobservables are not a concern – DD connections are likely orthogonal to the (considerable) 
variation captured by firm observables and unobservables (Altonji et al., 2005, Oster 2017). 
Finally, Column (8) adds a dummy for other Großbank connections. It suggests that affiliation 
with other Großbanken was associated with small increases in liabilities, relative to firms 
borrowing from neither DD nor any other Großbank – but not significantly so. 
Importantly, firms that borrowed from DD also saw a significantly stronger decline in 
their total wage bills (Panel B). Without controlling for covariates, DD borrowers’ wage bills 
fell by 25 p.p. more than those of firms that did not have connections with Danatbank or 
Dresdner Bank (column 1). Column (2) adds firm characteristics to control for the fact that 
Danat borrowers were on average larger and older. After controlling for firm size and age, 
return on assets, and leverage, DD borrowers still had significantly lower wage bill growth (-
19.5%). Column (3) adds industry fixed effects, the coefficient on DD remains significant and 
negative. In columns (4) and (5), we distinguish old and new Danat borrowers; effects are 
always of near-identical size and statistically indistinguishable. 
In columns (6) - (8) we use city fixed effects (column 6 reports the baseline coefficient 
for the sample of firms in cities with more than one firm). After absorbing shocks common to 
cities and industries, the coefficient on DD remains significant and negative (column 8). 
Comparing two firms within the same city and industry suggests that borrowing from Danat 
reduced the wage bill by 25.4 p.p. Column (8) also adds a dummy for other Großbank 
connections. Großbank connections raised wage bill growth, relative to firms not borrowing 
from any large bank, but not significantly. As in the case of liabilities, the coefficient of 
interest does not decline in size as we add controls and fixed effects: While R2 increases from 
0.04 to 0.42, the coefficient’s absolute size rises from -0.195 to -0.254. This implies 
observables and unobservables are likely orthogonal to the DD connection variable.39  
Overall, results in Panels A and B show a strong negative effect of DD connections on 
firms’ liabilities growth and wage growth: pre-crisis borrowing from Danat or Dresdner 
                                                 
38 A Wald test for the difference in the two coefficients results in a p-value of 0.99. 
39 An Oster test gives a delta of 1.11 for wages and 2.19 for liabilities, which implies that unobservable would 
have to be 1.11 (2.19) as important as our complete set of controls and fixed effects to undo the main effect. 
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reduced firms’ liabilities by 12 to 21 p.p. and firms’ total expenditure on employee wages and 
salaries by 15 to 29 p.p. during the crisis. 
 
B. City level 
Did bank failures radicalize voters, and did the financial crisis bring political extremism to 
power? If so, what were the economic and non-economic mechanisms? To address these 
questions, we aggregate firm connections to the city level. Danat’s failure led to a significant 
reduction in city-wide economic activity, as measured by income. Figure 5 summarizes our 
findings. It shows changes in city-level income and Nazi voting. The left panel plots income 
for a single cross-section, between 1928 and 1934. The tercile of cities with the highest 
exposure to Danat also saw the biggest fall in income – the higher exposure to Danat was, the 
greater the decline. Panel B on the right shows the mirror image in terms of Nazi support – the 
higher the level of exposure to failing banks, the greater the increase in right-wing radical 
voting. 
To analyze this link more systematically, we run regressions of the type: 
 
 
 
where yc is an outcome variable such as the change in income or votes for the NSDAP in city 
c, DD exposurec is city c’s exposure to firms connected to Danat and Dresdner, calculated 
from firm-level data (defined in equation 1). Controls include city latitude and longitude, log 
population in 1930, as well as its share of Protestants, Jews, and blue-collar workers in 1925 
out of its total population. In some regressions we also control for city exposure to other 
Großbanken, as well as exposure to the decline in exports. Cities with a higher exposure to 
DD-connected firms should see a stronger decline in income (β<0) and an increase in votes 
for the NSDAP (β>0). While regression equation (3) controls for several city characteristics, 
unobservable shocks could still bias our estimates. To address this issue, in robustness tests 
we estimate panel regressions with city and time fixed effects.40 
Table 5, Panel A, investigates this pattern systematically and provides the results of a 
regression of the change in income between 1928 and 1934 on city exposure.41 Column (1) 
                                                 
40 See table OA2. In a panel of cities, we find that income fell more after 1931 where exposure to Danat was 
greater, unemployment surged more, and the total number of firms declined rapidly. The magnitude of these 
effects is big, with declines in income of 21.1%, a rise in unemployment by 4.5%, and fall in the number of firms 
15.1% for a fully exposed city, relative to a city with no exposure. The result for the number of firms is not 
significant at conventional levels (p-value 0.16). 
41 To be precise, the date of publication for income was February 1934, and data refer to late 1933. 
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shows that without controls or fixed effects, higher Danat exposure significantly decreases 
city incomes. Controlling for socio-economic characteristics increases the coefficient 
significantly (column 2). Moving a city from the 50th to the 90th percentile in terms of 
exposure to Danatbank reduces city incomes by an additional (0.24 x 0.295=) 6.9% (48% of 
the average decline or 0.38 standard deviations). In column (3) we further control for common 
shocks through province fixed effects for Germany’s 15 electoral districts. The magnitude 
decreases only slightly when we allow for heterogeneity across regions and the coefficient 
remains strongly significant.42 Finally, columns (4)-(6) repeat the previous specifications, yet 
restrict the sample to cities with strictly positive exposure to Danat or Dresdner. In all cases, 
the new specification slightly strengthens the effect of Danat's failure on cities' local 
economies. Hence, even within the sample of cities that have positive exposure to Danat or 
Dresdner, higher exposure significantly reduced incomes. 
Exposure to failing banks also increased unemployment (Table 5, Panel B). We repeat 
the analysis in Panel A, but use the change in the unemployment rate from 1930 to 1933 as 
dependent variable. While adding controls to the specification reduces the magnitude of the 
coefficient on DD exposure somewhat, it remains significant across specifications (columns 1 
to 3).43 When we look at the intensive margin alone, we obtain similar results, except for a 
marginally insignificant result in the most demanding specification (column 6).44 
Did exposure to failing banks also lead to radicalization among the electorate? Table 6 
shows that it did. The increase in the Nazi vote share between 1930 and 1933 was greater the 
higher exposure to Danat was (Panel A, column 1). The effect is slightly stronger once we 
take regional differences into account in column (2). Moving a city from the 50th to the 90th 
percentile in terms of exposure increases the NSDAP vote share by 2.2 p.p. (9.8% of the mean 
or 0.41 standard deviations). Columns (3) – (6) look at vote gains between 1930 and the two 
parliamentary elections in 1932, in July and November. They show similarly large effects, but 
the biggest effect is visible for July 1932, immediately after the banking crisis.45 
Within less than a year of the banking crisis, voters strongly increased their support for 
an openly anti-Semitic party. Did these voters just turn a blind eye towards the Nazis' hateful 
                                                 
42 Importantly, Germany underwent a period of harsh austerity (Galofré-Vilà et al. 2018). Since some of it was 
implemented at the state level, and electoral districts are almost synonymous to states, use of district fixed effects 
allows us to control for differential changes in public spending that could have radicalized voters.  
43 Figure A2 examines developments over time: By 1932, cities with more DD exposure registered significantly 
higher unemployment (Panel A); no such pattern is visible for other Großbanken (Panel B). 
44 P-value 0.17. 
45 Table A2, Panel A, in the Appendix looks at Communist (KPD) voting. There is also a significant but smaller 
effect of DD exposure on the KPD vote share.45 As we add controls, the effect becomes even smaller. Nor is 
there evidence of a significant shift before 1933 (columns 3-6). The radicalization we observe on the extreme 
right part of the political spectrum in response to the banking crisis is not equally visible on the extreme left.  
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racial agenda, or did the banking crisis change people’s actions towards Jews? In towns and 
cities more affected by the 1931 banking crisis, the persecution of Jews was markedly worse 
after 1933 than in less affected areas. Panel B of Table 6 uses the share of deported Jews after 
1933 and the destruction of synagogues between 1933 and 1945 as dependent variables. Cities 
with high exposure deported a markedly higher share of Jews during the Holocaust (columns 
1 and 2). There were also more attacks on synagogues where the banking crisis struck 
(columns 3 and 4). Going from the 50th to the 90th percentile of exposure raised the 
deportation rate by 3.5 p.p. and increased the probability of synagogue damage by 14 p.p. 
While examining only these two variables does not do full justice to the cruelty of the Nazi 
regime and its victims, our findings suggest that anti-Semitic sentiment triggered by the 
banking crisis had repercussions even years after Danat's failure. 
 
C. Political Extremism: Mechanism 
Why did the banking crisis increase support for the Nazi party? There are two plausible 
channels through which banking distress may increase support for extremist parties. First, 
Danat’s default led to economic misery by reducing incomes, and this negative economic 
shock led to increased support for the NSDAP. However, the core of Nazi ideology centred on 
scapegoating Jews (and the hated Weimar “system”, allegedly dominated by Jews) for the 
depression. This may have increased anti-Semitic sentiments in addition to direct economic 
effects of the crisis. This section shows that both channels were at work. 
In Table 7, we disentangle the overall effect of income changes and the effects of the 
banking crisis above and beyond economic factors on voting for the extreme right. Columns 
(1) and (2) show that decreasing income had a direct effect on voter polarization. Cities with 
greater income declines turned more towards the Nazi Party. A one standard deviation drop in 
income is associated with (0.18 x 0.057) 1 % percent more votes for the NSDAP (0.19 
standard deviations). The decline in income used in columns (1) and (2) was caused by 
multiple factors, including the banking crisis. Columns (3) and (4) concentrate on the income 
loss due to the banking collapse. We first regress the overall change in income in a city on 
city exposure to Danat and Dresdner to separate the part of income loss explained by the 
banking crisis and the income loss orthogonal to Danat and Dresdner failures. Using only the 
income loss inflicted by the banking crisis, the effect on Nazi voting increases substantially 
compared to the effect of aggregate income losses. A one std. dev. decline in income caused 
by DD led to a 4.3 p.p. rise in Nazi support (while the average change in NSDAP vote share 
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from 1930 to 1932/33 was 19/22 p.p.).46 At the same time, a one std. dev. fall in income in 
general (not predicted by DD exposure) only increased Nazi votes by 1.1 p.p. While income 
and predicted income could be collinear, the correlation between both is 0.11. In columns (5) 
and (6) we include both overall and predicted income in regressions; coefficients remain 
similar in sign, size, and magnitude.  
Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we isolate the effect of exposure on radicalization that 
is not due to economic factors. In a first step, we regress the change in NSDAP votes on the 
change in unemployment and income. We then use only the residual as a dependent variable 
and regress it on DD exposure. The strong positive and significant coefficient suggests that 
the banking crisis radicalized voters even after accounting for any direct economic effects 
through falling incomes and rising unemployment. Its effect on voters' movement to the right 
goes above and beyond pure economic effects. 47 
Interestingly, unemployment did not have the same effects as income. Figure OA1 
shows that the overall level of unemployment in 1933 is a good predictor of Communist 
support, but not of Nazi support – in line with existing literature. Table A2, Panel B, 
demonstrates that neither in levels nor in first differences has unemployment predictive power 
for Nazi or Communist votes (or their changing vote share, 1930-33). Column (7) also shows 
that income changes do not predict Communist voting (while they do predict Nazi voting, as 
shown above).  
While falling incomes radicalized voters, exposure to the banking crisis had political 
consequences that exceeded pure economic effects. To demonstrate that the anti-Jewish 
message was important in the aftermath of the banking crisis, we first separate city exposure 
to Dresdner and Danat in our data. Since only Danat was led by a prominent Jewish banker, 
Jakob Goldschmidt, the effect on Nazi voting should not be present for exposure to Dresdner 
bank. Table 8, columns (1) and (2), show that Danat and Dresdner-exposed cities saw similar 
and statistically indistinguishable (additional) income declines (0.37 vs. 0.33).48 However, 
Nazi votes only surged in Danat-exposed towns (columns 4-6). The fact that only the Jewish-
led one of the two collapsing banks boosted the Nazis’ electoral fortunes strongly suggests 
that scapegoating of Jews for economic distress was crucial for the radicalization that 
followed the banking crisis. 
                                                 
46 The 1932 figure is for July. 
47 We find similar results if we use polynomials of income and unemployment. 
48 Appendix Table A3 shows that both Danat and Dresdner-associated firms saw a sharp decline in liabilities and 
in their wage bill. However, the decline was somewhat greater for Danat-affiliated firms. 
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Why did some voters increasingly flock to the Nazi party, even above and beyond any 
shift in behaviour driven by economic hardship? Table 9 explores this question in more detail. 
Anti-Semitic sentiment in Germany before the 1930s differed by municipality (Voigtländer 
and Voth 2012). We use these differences to split our city sample into two, as a function of 
historical anti-Semitism. We measure historical anti-Jewish sentiment using vote shares for 
anti-Semitic parties in elections around the late 19th century, as well as an earlier history of 
medieval pogroms. Panel A, columns (1) and (2), show that falling income affected Nazi 
voting in cities with and without a strong history of anti-Semitism. The part of income 
predicted by bank exposure, however, only has predictive power in highly anti-Semitic cities 
(columns 3 and 4). When we use both explanatory variables simultaneously (columns 5 and 
6), actual income is significant for low anti-Semitism cities, but predicted income (from the 
banking crisis) for high anti-Semitism ones. In columns (7) and (8) we again use the change in 
NSDAP votes orthogonal to changes in income and unemployment as the dependent variable. 
In cities where residents were less receptive to the Nazis' hateful anti-Jewish propaganda, 
there is no direct effect – over and above economic factors – of banking exposure on Nazi 
voting (column 7). The opposite is true in places with a history of voting for anti-Jewish 
parties (column 8). The effect above and beyond economic conditions is only present in areas 
where there was pre-existing anti-Semitism.  
Panel B repeats the exercise, distinguishing between places where pogroms were 
committed either during the Black Death in 1349/50 or during the 1920s. We find an almost 
identical pattern to Panel A – for places with a history of anti-Semitism, actual income 
declines matter much less than income changes predicted by exposure to the banking crisis. 
After accounting for economic changes, the banking crisis exposure itself matters only in 
high-anti-Semitism cities. These results suggest that the financial crisis may not have created 
anti-Semitism, but legitimized the public expression of hatred where it existed previously.49 In 
combination, these results suggest that one of the core Nazi messages fell on more fertile 
ground where pre-existing hostility toward Jews coincided with actual bank-induced 
suffering. 
As a final piece of evidence, we show that the banking crisis did not only affect 
voting, deportations, and violent attacks on synagogues – but that it also affected relations 
between Jews and gentiles more generally even before 1933. We collect monthly data on 
Jewish mixed marriages for a city-date panel of 51 cities. Table 10 shows the results for a 
difference-in-differences specification with Danat exposure interacted with a dummy for 
                                                 
49 This similar to recent work showing that expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment became more common once 
US voters realized that Donald Trump was going to win (Bursztyn et al. 2018). 
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months after July 1931. Each specification includes city and/or year fixed effects to control 
for unobservable city-specific characteristics, as well as common shocks. Columns (1) to (3) 
further support our explanation that the banking crisis increased anti-Semitism. Cities more 
exposed to the failing banks experienced a significant decline in mixed marriages by 17.3% 
compared to pre-crisis times, after controlling for common trends and unobservable city 
characteristics (column 3). This effect is not driven by an overall decrease in the frequency of 
Jewish marriages. Columns (3) to (5) use the log number of Jewish marriages as a placebo 
test. Cities exposed to the crisis did not see a significant change in Jewish marriages as such. 
While a rare event and indicative of deep involvement between Jews and gentiles, we 
consider it as a ‘canary in the coalmine’, reflecting not only romantic attachment but also the 
social acceptability of marrying across religious and ethnic.50  
In combination, our results strongly suggest that the Nazis’ anti-Jewish message was 
particularly successful in areas where it reactivated deep-rooted anti-Semitism, and where the 
banking shock was driven by exposure to the Jewish-led bank at the heart of the crisis. 
Finally, we show that it affected relations between Jews and gentiles, reducing the frequency 
of intermarriage after July 1931, and raising the deportation ratio and frequency of synagogue 
attacks after 1933. 
 
V. Robustness, placebo exercises, and alternative factors 
 
In this section, we show further robustness tests of our findings, including analyzing other 
economic shocks. We also show that there are no pre-trends towards greater Nazi voting in 
areas more exposed to failing banks. 
 
A. Placebos 
Voters in cities affected by the Danat collapse may have been turning towards the Nazis 
already. To examine this possibility, we use DD exposure as an explanatory variable for 
voting changes between every single federal election in Weimar Germany after 1923 (Table 
A4). Since the Nazi party was officially banned in 1924, we use combined votes for two 
surrogate parties – the DVFP and the NSFP. The NSFP competed with a near-identical 
agenda and many overlapping candidates. The DVFP offered joint lists with NSFP. Across 
specifications, DD exposure has no significant effect on right-wing votes – if anything, 
                                                 
50 Voigtländer and Voth 2013. 
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coefficients are mostly negative, suggesting that exposed cities tended to vote less for parties 
on the radical right than before the banking crisis. 
 
B. Robustness 
Outliers may have a significant effect on the results. We re-estimate baseline specifications 
and change the sample every time by excluding each firm (or city) one-by-one. Figure OA2, 
Panels A-C, show that the coefficient in our main specifications do not depend on individual 
outliers; they are stable across varying samples. 
Our results could also reflect regional shocks. Table A5 examines this possibility. The 
region around Bremen was also affected by the fall of Nordwolle, which may have had 
significant effects on the local economy. Danat had a strong foothold in Bremen and was 
lending to several firms; the effects we find may reflect Bremen’s economic distress, and not 
the effects of Danat’s collapse. A similar argument can be made by firms located at the border 
with Austria, which saw a dramatic crisis in May 1931 as the Oesterreichische Creditanstalt 
failed. The third region of concern is the Ruhr region, where a large share of German 
economic activity was concentrated. An overrepresentation of firms in that region may limit 
the economic significance and representativeness of our findings for Germany as a whole. To 
address these concerns, Table A5 shows that our firm-level results are robust to excluding 
each of these regions. 
 
C. Other economic shocks 
Could our results reflect the effect of other economic shocks? The German economy was 
affected by other headwinds during the early 1930s. The large decline in Germany’s 
international trade is one such change. The decline began shortly after the start of the Great 
Depression. If Danat-exposed cities were also large exporters, we may capture a response to a 
trade shock instead of a financial shock. Table A6 shows that exports overall are associated 
with income declines at the city-level; however, export shocks did not affect Nazi votes 
(columns 1 and 2).  
Finally, we examine if the extent of suffering induced by the hyperinflation is a 
possible confounding factor. The novelist Stefan Zweig’s famously argued that “…nothing 
embittered the German people so much … nothing made them so furious with hate and so ripe 
for Hitler as inflation.” (Zweig 1941). To measure the extent of suffering, we look at votes for 
a party (Volksrechtspartei – VRP) organized by inflation victims that sought a drastic 
revaluation of (old) Marks. Areas with higher VRP votes at the time of the hyperinflation did 
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not see more Nazi voting after the onset of the banking crisis. Moreover, adding the VRP 
indicator to our regressions does not reduce the coefficient on Danat exposure, and there is no  
significant interaction with DD exposure, either (columns 3 and 4). 
 
D. Spatially correlated errors 
Our data is spatial in nature, and spatially correlated errors could lead us to understate 
standard errors. Table A7 first examines the extent of spatial correlation. We compute 
Moran’s I for the change in Nazi and Communist votes, 1930-33, for income changes, 
unemployment changes, and Danat exposure. We find Danat and income changes are not 
significantly correlated, but all other variables are. Panel B reports the results from estimating 
regressions using our main specification, computing standard errors that account for spatial 
correlation. We continue to find highly significant results.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
There is a wide-spread belief that the recent upsurge in populism was rooted in the financial 
crisis of 2007-08; cross-country evidence over the last crisis and also over the last hundred 
years appears to confirm this conclusion (De Bromhead et al. 2013; Funke et al. 2016). A 
long-term perspective underlines the importance of scapegoating in turning the economic 
shocks of a financial crisis into political radicalization (Eichengreen 2018).  
The German case of 1931 provides causal evidence of the strength of these patterns, 
for a case that changed world history. We use new, detailed micro data on bank-firm linkages 
and a banking crisis shock (caused by external factors and political inactivity) to document 
three main empirical facts: First, we show that firms that were connected to Danat and 
Dresdner Bank suffered more when these banks collapsed. In particular, we find that 
liabilities and the total wage bill declined more sharply in firms that had previously been 
closely associated with Danat and Dresdner. The evidence suggest that effects are not driven 
by firm-level credit demand, but by bank lending restrictions caused by the crisis. 
Second, economic distress induced by the banking collapse boosted the Nazi Party’s 
electoral fortunes. High unemployment in general predicts Communist votes, but 
unemployment changes in Germany after 1930 have no predictive power for far-right voting. 
In contrast, income changes – and especially those predicted by exposure to failing banks – 
have strong predictive power for Nazi voting. These effects were sharper where the Nazis 
could tap into pre-existing anti-Semitic sentiment. Exposure to Danat (led by a Jewish 
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chairman) and Dresdner had the same economic effects – but only the former mapped 
strongly into more Nazi voting. At the same time, Jewish-gentile interfaith marriages declined 
markedly more in cities and towns exposed to Danat and Dresdner Bank. Finally, we show 
that there were marked repercussions – the local persecution of Jews after 1933 was more 
severe where the banking crisis had caused the greatest economic harm.  
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Figure 1: German industrial production
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Note: This figure shows the monthly index of industrial production of durable consumption goods for Germany (Wagemann 1936).
The production index is normalized to 100 in January 1930. The shaded area indicates the period of the 1931 banking crisis, from
the beginning of troubles at Austrian Creditanstalt to the merger between Danatbank and Dresdner Bank. Blue vertical lines
show: A beginning troubles at Austrian Creditanstalt (May 1931), B Nordwolle accounting irregularities discovered and Hoover
Moratorium established (June 1931), C failure of Danatbank and ensuing bank holidays (July 1931), and D forced merger of
Danatbank and Dresdner Bank.
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Figure 2: Bank credit and firm wage bills during the crisis
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Note: Panel A shows the change in total bank loans from 1931 to 1933 for all banks in Germany (All banks), and the four largest
banks, Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, as well as Danatbank and Dresdner Bank (Source: NBER macrohistory database and
Handbuch deutscher Aktiengesellschaften 1934). Panel B shows the average change in firm wage bill from 1929 to 1933 for firms
not connected to any of the four largest banks (Other connected), firms connected to Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank (Großbank
connected), and firms connected to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank (DD connected).
Figure 3: Firm size and pre-crisis leverage
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Note: Panel A shows distribution of log assets for wage bill sample of firms (blue line), as well as for the universe of listed firms
in 1929 (black line). Panel B shows firm leverage (defined as total liabilities over capital) for the universe of listed companies for
firms not connected to any of the four largest banks (Other connected, black line), firms connected to Commerzbank and Deutsche
Bank (Großbank connected, red line), and firms connected to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank (DD connected, blue line).
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Figure 4: Geographical distribution of Danat/Dresdner borrowers
no DD exposure
DD exposure
Note: This map of Germany shows the geographical distribution of cities with either positive or zero Danat/Dresdner exposure.
Blue dots indicate cities with DD exposure, grey diamonds those with no DD exposure.
Figure 5: City income and NSDAP votes
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Note: Panel A shows density of change in city incomes from 1928 to 1934 for cities in bottom, middle, and top tercile of DD
exposure. Note that income recorded in 1934 is for late 1933. Panel B shows density of change in NSDAP vote shares from
September 1930 to March 1933 elections.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for main variables
Panel A: Firm level
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
∆ wages 386 -.195 .76 -.65 -.39 -.06
∆ liabilities 258 -.16 .47 -.38 -.177 -.026
age 386 29.8 28.3 11 18 43
log assets 386 13.84 1.4 12.99 13.82 14.77
leverage 386 3.3 4.65 1.68 2.18 3.0
return on assets 386 .04 .13 0 .03 .06
wage bill/assets 386 .34 .50 .11 .24 .412
Danat+Dresdner 386 .15 .36 0 0 0
Danat 386 .07 .26 0 0 0
Dresdner 386 .1 .3 0 0 0
Großbank 386 .21 .41 0 0 0
Panel B: City level
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75
∆ income 187 -.143 .181 -.229 -.141 -.073
∆ income (predicted) 187 -.143 .077 -.197 -.143 -.088
∆ unemployment 1930-33 185 -.006 .039 -.031 -.003 .017
∆ NSDAP votes 1930-33 183 .223 .054 .187 .22 .263
∆ NSDAP votes 1930-33 (residual) 181 .222 .052 .19 .219 .26
∆ NSDAP votes 1930-7/32 176 .173 .064 .143 .176 .218
∆ NSDAP votes 1930-11/32 176 .128 .06 .092 .129 .167
∆ KPD votes 1930-33 182 -.001 .025 -.017 .001 .018
synagogue damaged or destroyed 187 .754 .432 1 1 1
deportations/pop 187 .296 .157 .189 .287 .384
population 1930 187 92645.46 132119 28200 40700 83700
share blue collar 187 .417 .093 .349 .411 .48
share Jewish 187 .009 .008 .004 .006 .012
share Protestant 187 .663 .29 .484 .795 .895
anti-Semitic votes 1900 81 .029 .073 0 .005 .022
Black Death pogrom 61 .607 .493 0 1 1
DD exposure 187 .081 .117 0 .02 .136
exposure (Großbank) 187 .13 .146 0 .089 .219
exposure (Danat) 187 .05 .103 0 0 .051
exposure (Dresdner) 187 .04 .08 0 0 .044
Note: Panel A shows summary statistics for main firm-level variables, Panel B for main city-level variables. Danat+Dresdner is a
dummy that refers to firms connected to either Danat or Dresdner, Großbank to firms connected to other large banks. For other
variable definitions, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Firm sample balancedness
Dependent variable: Danat+Dresdner-connected (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sample All >1 obs per city Großbank>0
age 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log assets 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.092*** 0.039 0.049
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.035) (0.036)
return on assets 0.140 0.029 0.077 1.399*** 0.837
(0.138) (0.142) (0.241) (0.534) (0.596)
leverage -0.008** -0.007* -0.001 -0.030 -0.033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
wage bill/assets 0.006 0.009 -0.019 -0.132 -0.056
(0.036) (0.037) (0.055) (0.184) (0.205)
Industry FE - X X - X
City FE - - X - -
Observations 386 386 194 122 122
R-squared 0.100 0.164 0.472 0.089 0.263
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with Danat+Dresdner as dependent variable, where Danat+Dresdner is a
dummy with value one if a firm is connected to either Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. All variables are defined in Table A1. Industry
FE includes a set of 20 industry fixed effects; City FE require at least 2 firms per city. Großbank>0 restricts the sample to firms
connected with at least one of the Großbanken - the large German universal banks.
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Table 3: City sample balancedness
Dependent variable: DD exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sample All Großbank>0 anti-Semitism>0
log population 0.022** 0.025** 0.008 0.021
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021)
share blue collar -0.204** -0.237** -0.183 -0.153
(0.095) (0.100) (0.143) (0.180)
share Jewish 1.089 0.471 0.026 1.214
(1.171) (1.560) (1.920) (3.713)
share Protestant -0.030 -0.078 -0.103 -0.073
(0.034) (0.047) (0.065) (0.095)
log income p.c. 0.002 0.012 0.077 0.062
(0.027) (0.028) (0.050) (0.047)
unemployment rate 0.169 0.162 0.200 0.434
(0.148) (0.156) (0.175) (0.534)
latitude of the city -0.001 0.011 0.013 -0.048
(0.006) (0.019) (0.025) (0.042)
longitude of the city -0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.011
(0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.026)
anti-Semitic votes 1900 0.005
(0.003)
Black Death pogrom 0.015
(0.040)
Electoral District FE - X X X
Observations 187 187 136 61
R-squared 0.111 0.191 0.060 0.181
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with DD exposure as dependent variable on main city characteristics. DD
exposure is a city’s exposure to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank. All variables are defined in Table A1. Electoral District fixed
effects are dummies for Germany’s 15 electoral provinces. Großbank>0 restricts the sample to cities with positive exposure to at
least one large German bank. anti-Semitism restricts the sample to cities for which we have data on historical anti-Semitic votes
or pogroms.
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Table 4: Changes in wage bills and liabilities - DD connected firms
Panel A: Change in firm liabilities, 1929-33
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
sample All City FE sample
Danat+Dresdner -0.133*** -0.116** -0.167** -0.191** -0.145* -0.209*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.068) (0.074) (0.085) (0.113)
Danat+Dresdner (old) -0.090 -0.112
(0.057) (0.068)
Danat+Dresdner (new) -0.170** -0.196**
(0.078) (0.095)
Großbank 0.023
(0.092)
Observations 258 258 256 258 256 102 102 102
R-squared 0.011 0.063 0.109 0.066 0.108 0.091 0.376 0.523
Firm Controls - X X X X X X X
Industry FE - - X - X - - X
City FE - - - - - - X X
Panel B: Change in firm wage bills, 1929-33
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
sample All City FE sample
Danat+Dresdner -0.250*** -0.195*** -0.152** -0.195*** -0.285** -0.254*
(0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.069) (0.107) (0.134)
Danat+Dresdner (old) -0.188** -0.125
(0.093) (0.094)
Danat+Dresdner (new) -0.189** -0.137*
(0.079) (0.073)
Großbank 0.068
(0.126)
Observations 386 386 384 386 384 194 194 194
R-squared 0.014 0.022 0.076 0.023 0.075 0.043 0.360 0.421
Firm Controls - X X X X X X X
Industry FE - - X - X - - X
City FE - - - - - - X X
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of each panel. The dependent
variable in Panel A is the change in a firm’s liabilities between 1929 and 1933. The dependent variable in Panel B is the change in
a firm’s wage bills between 1929 and 1933. Danat+Dresdner is a dummy variable with value 1 if a firm is connected to Danatbank
or Dresdner Bank. Großbank is a dummy variable with value 1 if a firm is connected to any other Großbank. Danat+Dresdner
(old) is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a firm was connected to Darmstädter Bank before 1923. Firms that only acquired a
connection afterwards are indicated by Danat+Dresdner (new). Firm controls (recorded in 1929) include age, log(assets), leverage,
return on assets, and capital-to-labor ratio. All variables are described in Table A1. Industry fixed effects capture 20 industries.
In each panel, columns (1) to (5) use the full sample. Column (6) in each panel replicates the baseline regression in column (2),
using the smaller sample of cities and industries with at least two firms, which is subsequently used in columns (7) to (8) in each
panel. Standard errors are clustered on the city level. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: City income and unemployment
Panel A: Change in city income, 1928-34
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sample All DD exposure>0
DD exposure -0.177* -0.295*** -0.248** -0.239* -0.313** -0.263*
(0.103) (0.110) (0.104) (0.142) (0.127) (0.132)
Observations 187 187 187 103 103 102
R-squared 0.013 0.182 0.237 0.035 0.119 0.210
City Controls - X X - X X
Electoral District FE - - X - - X
Panel B: Change in unemployment, 1930-33
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sample All DD exposure>0
DD exposure 0.095*** 0.064*** 0.039* 0.063*** 0.058** 0.038
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Observations 185 185 185 102 102 101
R-squared 0.080 0.270 0.461 0.047 0.252 0.463
City Controls - X X - X X
Electoral District FE - - X - - X
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of each panel. The dependent
variable in Panel A is the change in city income between 1928 and 1934. The dependent variable in Panel B is the change in city
unemployment rate between 1930 and 1933. DD exposure measures the degree of city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank
and Dresdner Bank. City controls include log population, share of blue collar, Jewish, and protestants, as well as city latitude and
longitude. All variables are described in Table A1. Electoral district fixed effects are dummies for Germany’s 15 electoral areas. In
each panel, columns (1)-(3) use the full sample, columns (4)-(6) only cities with DD exposure greater than 0. Standard errors are
robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Nazi support and Jewish persecution
Panel A: Nazi electoral results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep. var.: ∆ NSDAP ∆ NSDAP ∆ NSDAP
9/30-3/33 9/30-7/32 9/30-11/32
DD exposure 0.072** 0.091*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.063* 0.068**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032)
Observations 193 193 183 183 182 182
R-squared 0.282 0.403 0.499 0.595 0.320 0.434
Electoral District FE - X - X - X
Panel B: Persecution after 1933
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep. var.: deported/population synagogue attack
DD exposure 0.147* 0.119 0.584*** 0.662***
(0.077) (0.081 (0.180) (0.192) )
Observations 189 189 188 188
R-squared 0.270 0.374 0.214 0.309
Electoral District FE - X - X
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of the column. In Panel A,
the dependent variable is the change in NSDAP vote share between September 1930 and March 1933 in columns (1) and (2), the
change in NSDAP vote share between September 1930 and July 1932 in columns (3) and (4), and the change in NSDAP vote share
between September 1930 and November 1932 in columns (5) and (6). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the number of total
deportations normalized by city population in columns (1) and (2) and a dummy with value one if synagogue were attacked or
destroyed in columns (3) and (4). DD exposure denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank. City
controls include log population, share of blue collar, Jewish, and protestants, as well as city latitude and longitude. All variables
are defined in Table A1. Electoral district fixed effects are dummies for Germany’s 15 electoral areas. Standard errors are robust.
Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Economic and non-economic effects of Danat exposure on voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dep. var.: ∆ NSDAP 1930-33 ∆ NSDAP 1930-33 (res)
∆ income -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.042** -0.048**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
∆ income (predicted) -0.450*** -0.558*** -0.382** -0.495***
(0.168) (0.167) (0.170) (0.165)
DD exposure 0.067** 0.085***
(0.030) (0.029)
Observations 183 183 183 183 183 183 181 181
R-squared 0.281 0.385 0.283 0.395 0.300 0.414 0.306 0.433
Electoral District FE - X - X - X - X
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of the column. The dependent
variable is the change in NSDAP vote share between September 1930 and March 1933 in columns (1)-(6). The dependent variable
in columns (7) and (8) is the residual of a regression of change in NSDAP vote share between 1930 and 1933 on the change in
income between 1928 and 1934 and the change in unemployment between 1939 and 1933. DD exposure denotes city exposure to
firms connected to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank. ∆ income (predicted) is predicted change in income by regressing change in
income on DD exposure. City controls include log population, share of blue collar, Jewish, and protestants, as well as city latitude
and longitude. All other variables are described in Table A1. Electoral district fixed effects are dummies for Germany’s 15 electoral
areas. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: City level: Danat vs. Dresdner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep. var.: ∆ income ∆ NSDAP
exposure (Danat) -0.366*** -0.342** 0.077* 0.077*
(0.135) (0.134) (0.043) (0.043)
exposure (Dresdner) -0.328* -0.264 0.013 -0.001
(0.171) (0.172) (0.068) (0.067)
Observations 185 185 185 181 181 181
R-squared 0.174 0.156 0.181 0.286 0.271 0.286
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of the column. The dependent
variable is the change in income between 1928 and 1934 in columns (1)-(3) and the change in NSDAP vote share between September
1930 and March 1933 in columns (4)-(6). exposure (Danat) denotes city exposure to Danatbank only, exposure (Dresdner) denotes
city exposure to Dresdner Bank only. City controls include log population, share of blue collar, Jewish, and protestants, as well as
city latitude and longitude. All variables are described in Table A1. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 9: Radicalization and pre-existing beliefs
Panel A: Voting for anti-Semitic parties, 1890-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dep. var.: ∆ NSDAP 1930-33 ∆ NSDAP 1930-33 (res)
vote-share AS parties low high low high low high low high
∆ income -0.117* -0.070** -0.116* -0.039
(0.058) (0.033) (0.060) (0.041)
∆ income (predicted) -0.064 -0.410*** -0.011 -0.342**
(0.277) (0.135) (0.271) (0.163)
DD exposure 0.006 0.135**
(0.089) (0.061)
Observations 40 41 40 41 40 41 40 41
R-squared 0.388 0.304 0.338 0.353 0.388 0.369 0.388 0.376
Panel B: Historic pogroms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dep. var.: ∆ NSDAP 1930-33 ∆ NSDAP 1930-33 (res)
historic pogroms? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
∆ income -0.038 -0.043 -0.042 0.005
(0.060) (0.070) (0.068) (0.075)
∆ income (predicted) -0.102 -0.297* 0.040 -0.301*
(0.409) (0.146) (0.454) (0.166)
DD exposure -0.008 0.127*
(0.201) (0.070)
Observations 25 36 25 36 25 36 25 36
R-squared 0.497 0.314 0.489 0.376 0.497 0.377 0.499 0.377
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of the column. In both
panels, the dependent variable is the change in NSDAP vote share between September 1930 and March 1933 in columns (1)-(6).
The dependent variable in columns (7) and (8) is the residual of a regression of change in NSDAP vote share between 1930 and
1933 on the change in income between 1928 and 1934 and the change in unemployment between 1939 and 1933. In each panel,
cities are divided whether they have high or low pre-existing anti-Semitic beliefs. Panel A measures pre-existing beliefs by a city’s
historic vote share for anti-Semitic parties. Panel B measures pre-existing beliefs using a dummy whether a city had a pogrom in
1349 or 1920. DD exposure is city exposure to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. ∆ income (predicted) is predicted change in income
by regressing change in income on DD exposure. City controls include log population, share of blue collar, Jewish, and protestants,
as well as city latitude and longitude. All variables are described in Table A1. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Mixed marriages and intra-faith marriages over time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep. var.: log(Jew-Gentile) log(Jew-Jew)
high DD exposure × post banking crisis -0.092*** -0.147** -0.173*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.032) (0.062) (0.065) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,342
R-squared 0.608 0.631 0.633 0.076 0.102 0.105
City controls - - X - - X
City FE X X X X X X
Year FE - X X - X X
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of the column. The dependent
variable is the log of monthly marriages between Jews and Gentiles in columns (1)-(3) and the log of monthly marriages between
Jews in columns (4)-(6). high DD exposure is a dummy for cities with high exposure to Danat or Dresdner bank, post banking
crisis a dummy with value 1 for the months after July 1931. City controls include yearly population and unemployment rate, as
well as an interaction term of post default and Großbank exposure. Observations are on the city-month level from January 1930 to
March 1933. All variables are described in Table A1. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix
Figure A1: “Der Stürmer” caricature
Note: This figure shows a caricature from the pro-Nazi newspaper “Der Stürmer”, published in the summer of 1931. The caption
says “The Jew banker and the German business man”, suggesting that Jewish-led banks are to blame for Germany’s dire economic
situation.
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Figure A2: City panel: Unemployment – coefficients by year
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Note: Each panel shows coefficients for regressions
log(UE)c,t =
∑
i 6=1930 βi DD exposurec × yeart=i +
∑
i 6=1930 γi GB exposurec × yeart=i + log(population)c,t + θc + τs,t + c,t,
where log(UE) denotes log unemployment at the city-year level, θc and τs,t denote city and state-year fixed effects. Panel A shows
yearly coefficients on city exposure to Danat and Dresdner, panel B to other large banks. Standard errors are clustered on the city
level. Blue bars denote 90 % confidence intervals.
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Table A1: Variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source Unit
Firm-level variables
∆ wages Change in a firm’s total wage bill between 1929 and
1933
Handbook of German Stock Companies %
∆ liabilities Change in a firm’s total liabilities between 1929 and
1933
Handbook of German Stock Companies %
age Firm’s age in years as of 1929 Handbook of German Stock Companies Years
log assets Firm’s log assets as of 1929 Handbook of German Stock Companies
leverage Firm’s ratio of liabilities (excluding equity) over
capital as of 1929
Handbook of German Stock Companies %
return on assets Firm’s ratio of profits over assets as of 1929 Handbook of German Stock Companies %
Danat+Dresdner Dummy with value 1 if a firm was connected to
Danatbank or Dresdner Bank in 1929
Handbook of German Stock Companies {0,1}
Danat Dummy with value 1 if a firm was connected to
Danatbank in 1929
Handbook of German Stock Companies {0,1}
Dresdner Dummy with value 1 if a firm was connected to
Dresdner Bank in 1929
Handbook of German Stock Companies {0,1}
Großbank Dummy with value 1 if Firm was connected to any
Großbank other than Danatbank or Dresdner Bank
in 1929
Handbook of German Stock Companies {0,1}
City-level variables
DD exposure City’s exposure to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank.
The exact calculation is described in equation (1)
Handbook of German Stock Companies [0,1]
exposure (Danat) Exposure only to Danatbank Handbook of German Stock Companies [0,1]
exposure (Dresdner) Exposure only to Dresdner Bank Handbook of German Stock Companies [0,1]
exposure (Großbank) Exposure to all large banks except Danatbank or
Dresdner Bank
Handbook of German Stock Companies [0,1]
∆ income Change in city-level income between 1928 and 1934 Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, Neue Folge,
1884-1944
%
∆ income (predicted) Predicted income of a regression of the change in
income on DD exposure
%
∆ unemployment 1930-33 Change in unemployment rate between 1930 and
1933
Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte %
∆ NSDAP 1930-33 Change in vote share for the NSDAP between the
elections in September 1930 and March 1933
Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (ICPSR 42) %
∆ NSDAP 1930-33 (residual) Residual of a regression of ∆ NSDAP 1930-33 on
∆income and ∆unemployment
%
∆ NSDAP 9/30-7/32 Change in vote share for the NSDAP between the
elections in September 1930 and July 1932
Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (ICPSR 42) %
∆ NSDAP 9/30-11/32 Change in vote share for the NSDAP between the
elections in September 1930 and November 1932
Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (ICPSR 42) %
∆ KPD 9/30-33 Change in vote share for the KPD between the elec-
tions in September 1930 and March 1933
Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (ICPSR 42) %
population 1930 City population in 1930 Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte %
share blue collar Share of blue collar workers in total city population Falter and Hänisch (1990) census %
share Jewish Share of Jewish population in total city population Falter and Hänisch (1990) %
share Protestant Share of Protestants in total city population Falter and Hänisch (1990) %
synagogue dam. or dest. Dummy whether a synagogue was destroyed or
damaged after 1933
Alicke(2008) {0,1}
deportations/pop Number of Jews deported between 1933 and 1945
over a city’s Jewish population
Bundesarchiv %
anti-Semitic votes 1900 Vote share for anti-Semitic parties in 1900 Statistische Jahrbücher des dt. Reichsamts
für Statistik
%
Black Death pogrom dummy that is 1 if a city had a pogrom in 1349 Germanica Judaica {0,1}
log exports Logarithm of aggregate industry exports in 1929,
attributed to a city’s based on share of firm assets
in a given industry over total firm assets
Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Re-
iches
Note: This table lists main variables, data sources, and units for the firm and city level. For further details and variable construction,
see text.
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Table A2: Unemployment vs. income and extremist voting
Panel A: Communist party (KPD) electoral results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep. var.: ∆ KPD ∆ KPD ∆ KPD
9/30-3/33 9/30-7/32 9/30-11/32
DD exposure 0.042** 0.026* 0.006 0.010 0.020 0.023
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 189 189 179 179 181 181
R-squared 0.135 0.366 0.073 0.210 0.085 0.206
Electoral District FE - X - X - X
Panel B: Extremist voting and city outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dep. var.: KPD NSDAP KPD NSDAP ∆ KPD ∆ NSDAP ∆ KPD ∆ NSDAP
UE 0.476*** -0.040
(0.057) (0.087)
∆ UE 0.122 -0.029 -0.093 -0.371
(0.277) (0.296) (0.137) (0.253)
∆ income 0.013 -0.057***
(0.011) (0.019)
Observations 190 190 189 189 185 189 183 187
R-squared 0.502 0.583 0.521 0.589 0.359 0.373 0.382 0.392
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted on top of the columns. In Panel A,
the dependent variable is the change in KPD vote share between September 1930 and March 1933 in columns (1) and (2), the
change in KPD vote share between September 1930 and July 1932 in columns (3) and (4), and the change in KPD vote share
between September 1930 and November 1932 in columns (6) and (6). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the vote share of KPD
in September 1930 in columns (1) and (3), the vote share of NSDAP in September 1930 in columns (2) and (4), and the changes in
the vote shares of the respective party between September 1930 and March 1933 in columns (5)-(8). DD exposure denotes a city’s
exposure to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank. UE denotes a city’s unemployment in 1933. ∆ UE and ∆ income denote the change in
city unemployment from 1930-1933 and change in city income from 1928-1934. All regressions control for log population, share of
blue collar, Jewish, and protestants, as well as city latitude and longitude. All variables are defined in Table A1. Electoral district
fixed effects are dummies for Germany’s 15 electoral provinces, which are included in all regressions in Panel B. Standard errors
are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3: Firm level: Danat vs. Dresdner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dep. var.: ∆ wages ∆ liabilities
Danat + Dresdner -0.198*** -0.123**
(0.063) (0.049)
Danat -0.269*** -0.264*** -0.131** -0.123*
(0.082) (0.081) (0.066) (0.065)
Dresdner -0.143** -0.136** -0.107* -0.099*
(0.070) (0.069) (0.059) (0.056)
Observations 386 386 386 386 258 258 258 258
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.019 0.026 0.075 0.072 0.072 0.076
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted on top of the columns. The dependent
variable is the change in a firm’s wage bills between 1929 and 1933 in columns (1)-(4) and the change in a firm’s liabilities in
columns (5)-(8). Danat+Dresdner is a dummy that is 1 if a firm is connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank, Danat is a dummy
that is 1 if a firm is connected to Danatbank, and Dresdner is a dummy that is 1 if a firm is connected to Dresdner Bank. All
regressions include firm controls as of 1929: age, log(assets), leverage, return on assets, and capital-to-labor ratio. All variables are
defined in Table A1. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4: City level: Elections before the banking crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dep. var.: far right 05/24 ∆ far right 05/24-12/24 ∆ far right 12/24-28 ∆ NS 28-30 NS Sept. 30
DD exposure -0.040 -0.026 0.047 -0.037 -0.054
(0.048) (0.053) (0.044) (0.027) ( 0.035)
Observations 190 190 190 193 193
R-squared 0.156 0.439 0.553 0.303 0.282
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted on top of the columns. When the
NSDAP was banned (1924), we use votes for the DVFP (Deutsch-Völkische Freiheitspartei) and the NSFP (Nationalsozialistische
Freiheitspartei). The latter was a direct substitute for the NSDAP; the former agreed to a joint list. The dependent variable is
the vote share for these two far-right parties in 1924 in column (1), the change in vote share between May and December 1924 in
column (2), the change in vote share between December 1924 and 1928 in column (3), the change in NSDAP vote share between
1928 and September 1930 in column (4), and the vote share of NSDAP in September 1930 in column (5). DD exposure denotes
a city’s exposure to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank. All regressions control for log population, share of blue collar, Jewish, and
protestants, as well as city latitude and longitude. All variables are defined in Table A1. Standard errors are robust. Key: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Firm level: Robustness to excluding regions
Firm wage bill change, 1929 to 1933
(1) (2) (3)
dropped region Austrian border Bremen Ruhr
Danat + Dresdner -0.185*** -0.181*** -0.204***
(0.062) (0.064) (0.068)
Observations 323 375 332
R-squared 0.024 0.021 0.023
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the change in a firm’s wage bill between 1929 and 1933 as dependent
variable. Each column excludes cities located in the region denoted at the top of the column from the sample. All regressions
include firm controls as of 1929: age, log(assets), leverage, return on assets, and capital-to-labor ratio. All variables are defined in
Table A1. Standard errors are clustered on the city level. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A6: City level: Exports and hyperinflation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep. var.: ∆ income ∆ NSDAP
log exports -0.011* 0.005
(0.007) (0.003)
DD exposure 0.059*
(0.033)
hyperinf. candidates 0.020 0.007
(0.014) (0.020)
DD exposure × hyperinf. candidates 0.057
(0.083)
Observations 187 189 189 189
R-squared 0.374 0.273 0.265 0.288
Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted on top of the columns. The dependent
variable is the change in city income between 1928 and 1934 in column (1) and the change in NSDAP vote share between September
1930 and March 1933 in columns (2)-(4). log exports denote city-level exports as of 1929. DD exposure denotes a city’s exposure
to Danatbank and Dresdner Bank. hyperinf. candidates is the vote share for candidates of the VRP (“Volksrechtspartei”). All
regressions include log population, share of blue collar, Jewish, and protestants, as well as city latitude and longitude. All variables
are defined in Table A1. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7: City level: Robustness to spatial autocorrelation
Panel A: Moran’s I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
var.: ∆ NSDAP ∆ KPD ∆ Income ∆ UE DD exposure
Moran’s I 0.080*** 0.160*** 0.007 0.052*** 0.005
Panel B: Main regressions using adjusted standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep. var.: ∆ NSDAP ∆ KPD ∆ Income ∆ UE
DD exposure 0.0814** 0.0336* -0.285** 0.0265**
(2.75) (2.15) (-2.59) (2.70)
λ 0.0160** -0.000319 -0.000000553 0.00122*
(2.80) (-0.79) (-0.00) (1.66)
σ 0.0442** 0.0233** 0.164** 0.0146**
(18.92) (18.92) (18.92) (18.92)
Observations 179 179 179 179
Note: Panel A: Each column provides Moran’s I, a measure of spatial autocorrelation, for the variable denoted at the top of the
column. The statistic is produced using Stata’s spatgse command. Panel B: Each column provides the results of a regression with
the dependent variable denoted at the top of the column. DD exposure measures a city’s exposure to Danatbank and Dresdner
Bank. λ is a parameter estimate of the spatial lag. Standard errors are corrected for spatial autocorrelation. The results are
produced using Stata’s spatreg command. All variables are described in Table A1. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
53
Online Appendix
Figure OA1: Extremist voting and unemployment in 1933
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Note: Panel A shows a binscatter plot of a regression of KPD’s vote share in 1933 on city unemployment in 1933. Panel B shows
a binscatter plot of a regression of NSDAP’s vote share in 1933 on city unemployment. Red lines denote linear fits. All variables
are described in Table A1.
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Figure OA2: Stability of coefficient and t-value
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(B) City income
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(C) City NSDAP votes
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Note: Each panel excludes one observations when estimating the underlying specification and then ranks observations by the effect
that this observation has on the estimated coefficient. Panel A plots coefficient and t-value of coefficient on Danat+Dresdner in
regression ∆wagesf = βDanat+Dresdnerf + controlsf + f on the y-axis. Dependent variable is growth in firm wage bill from
1929 to 1933. Each regression drops one individual firm. The x-axis ranks firms according to their impact on the coefficient, from
highest to lowest. The blue dashed line denotes coefficient estimates, the black solid line the corresponding t-value. Panels B and
C do the same for the city level and run baseline city regression equation ∆yc = β DD exposurec + controlsc + c with change
in income or NSDAP votes as dependent variable. Across specifications, excluding firms or cities one-for-one does not change
coefficients of interest in terms of sign, size, or significance.
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Table OA1: Firm level: Danat’s old and new borrowers
old borrowers new borrowers difference
mean sd mean sd t
age 49.78 (36.45) 28.74 (26.38) -2.61
log assets 15.31 (1.18) 14.13 (1.12) -4.19
leverage 2.66 (3.14) 2.36 (1.03) -0.47
return on assets 0.06 (0.09) 0.05 (0.06) -0.47
wage bill/assets 0.30 (0.22) 0.32 (0.32) 0.39
Observations 45 27 72
Note: Summary statistics for main firm-level control variables for the sample of firms with Danat connection. Column (1) restricts
the sample to firms connected to either the Nationalbank or the Darmstaedter Bank in 1922, before both banks merged to form
Danat. Column (2) restricts the sample to firms whose connection with Danat was established after the merger. Column (3)
provides the t-statistic testing for significant differences in means between the two samples.
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Table OA2: City level: Panel with fixed effects
(1) (2) (3)
dep. var.: log(income) unemp. rate log(firms)
DD exposure × 1(1932-34) -0.211** 0.045** -0.151
(0.106) (0.019) (0.102)
Observations 975 975 975
R-squared 0.984 0.878 0.990
City FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Note: Each column provides the results of a regression with the dependent variable denoted at the top of each column. The
dependent variable is log city income in column (1), unemployment rate in column (2), and the log number of firms in column (3).
DD exposure denotes city exposure to Danat or Dresdner, 1(1932-34) denotes a dummy with value 1 for the years 1932-34. Income
is interpolated for missing years. All regressions include log population and Großbank exposure interacted with the post dummy.
All variables are defined in Table A1. All regressions include city and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the city
level. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table OA3: Bank lending during the crisis
Dependent variable: log(loans)
(1) (2)
Danat+Dresdner × 1(1932-34) -0.156** -0.210*
(0.057) (0.105)
Observations 20 20
R-squared 0.996 0.997
Bank Controls - X
Note: Each column provides the results of a regression with the log of loans (in Reichsmark) by a large bank. Danat+Dresdner is
a dummy with value 1 for Danat and Dresdner, and zero for other German large banks. 1(1932-34) denotes a dummy with value
one for years 1932-34. Bank controls include capital ratio, profits, and dividend payments. All variables are described in Table A1.
All regressions include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table OA4: City level: Danat vs. Dresdner
Dependent variable: Change in unemployment 30-33
(1) (2) (3)
exposure (Danat) 0.054* 0.049
(0.032) (0.033)
exposure (Dresdner) 0.060* 0.050
(0.034) (0.036)
Observations 189 189 189
R-squared 0.244 0.239 0.250
Note: Each column provides the results of a regressions with the change in the unemployment rate between 1930 and 1933 as
dependent variable. exposure (Danat) denotes city exposure to Danat only, exposure (Dresdner) denotes city exposure to Dresdner
only. All regressions include log population, share of blue collar, Jews, and Protestants, as well as city latitude and longitude. All
variables are described in Table A1. Standard errors are robust. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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